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“Islamic tradition”: questioning the Bosnian model
Zora Hesová219, Charles University, Prague
Introduction
Debates over whether there can be a ‘European Islam’ have not ceased since 1990s when the 
term was coined by Bassam Tibi. Decried as an assimilationist imposition on Muslims for 
whom Islam does not bear adjectives, it still lives on in other forms, such as in Emmanuel 
Macron’s ‘Islam of France’. Since the mid-2000s the case of the ‘other European Muslims’ in 
the Balkans has attracted attention and questioning: are there not already autochthonous 
European Muslim communities with an experience of existing within secular state?220 
Indeed, the oldest of these communities and its form of the religion, ‘Bosnian Islam’, has 
since been held up as a potential model for other European Muslims and their relation to 
modern secular states.221 
When Riada Asimović Akyol recently wrote in the Atlantic that ‘the history and practice 
of Bosnian Islam yields a number of noteworthy lessons for those seeking to cultivate a 
liberal Islam in Europe’, she identified such a liberal version of Islam with the Bosniak’s 
acceptance of the modern state during Austro-Hungarian rule, in the administrative 
centralisation of its institutions, in the prominence of Islamic modernism in Bosnia and 
in history of secularisation – in short, the Bosniak’s adaptability to modernity and secular 
contexts is a model to be imitated.
This paper aims to question the idea of a ‘progress towards a liberal Islam’ as being 
too straightforward by providing historical, political and also intellectual context to the 
practice of Islam in Bosnia and, above all, by analysing the present logic of looking for a 
particular Islamic identity. I will propose a reflection on what the ‘Bosnian model’ might 
mean in three steps – defining the Bosnian model; placing it in historical context; and 
reconstructing the context of the contemporary Islamic community’s efforts to define the 
Bosnian Islamic tradition and assessing its results. 
219 Zora Hesová, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Political Science at Faculty 
of Arts, Charles University, Prague and fellow ať the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech 
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populist politics in Eastern Europe.  Contact email: zora.hesova@ff.cuni.cz 
220 F. Karčić, ‘The Other European Muslims. A Bosnian Experience’, Sarajevo: Centre for Advanced 
Studies, 2015.
221 X. Bougarel, ‘Bosnian Islam as ‘European Islam’: Limits and Shifts of a Concept’, in A. Al-Azmeh, 
and E. Fokas (eds.), Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007); See also Dž. Šuško, ‘Ein Modell für Europa? Geschichte und Praxis des 
Islam in Bosnien-Herzegowina’, in Auslandsinformationen 4|2017, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2017; and S. Bektović, ‘European Islam in the Light of the Bosnian Experience’, in N. Vinding, 
E. Racius and J. Thielmann (eds.), Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe, (Leiden: Brill, 
2018). 
129papErs dElivErEd to thE ConfErEnCE
A Bosnian model for Europe?
The attractiveness of the Bosnian model is based on two main factors: first, it represents 
a modernised sort of Islamic practice while being autochthonous and legitimate, and 
second, it has the potential to become a template for other Muslim communities. Asimović 
Akyol points to Bosnian’s capacity for ‘embracing modernity without abandoning religious 
identity’ and highlights that an ‘institutionalized, centralized form of Islam can be highly 
successful, as seen in the case of the Islamic Community’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Acknowledging the impossibility of replicating concrete institutions elsewhere, she is 
nonetheless confident that Bosnia can indeed function as a positive example of how Islam 
and Europe, are ‘far from incompatible – in fact, they have been intertwined for centuries’.222
French historian Xavier Bougarel agrees that ‘all of these debates can be boiled down to 
a central issue: that of the relationship between Islam and Western modernity’.223 In his 
view, Bosnia clearly presents tendencies towards a kind of European Islamic modernity. 
Its major proponent, Fikret Karčić, is also the author of the influential definition of the 
‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’, which in his view comprises five key elements: 1) Hanafi–
Maturidi doctrinal belonging; 2) Ottoman–Islamic cultural heritage; 3) the Islamisation 
of pre-Ottoman practices; 4) the tradition of Islamic reformism in the interpretation of 
Islam; 5) the institutionalisation of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community; and 6) the 
practice of expression of Islam in a secular state.224 
In Bougarel’s view from the mid-2000s, Karčić’s vision of ‘individualised Islam in a secular 
state’, represented one possible trajectory among others including, identifying Islam as a 
‘common culture’, and a politicised vision of Islam as a nationalist ideology. These were, 
implicitly, in competition. In Bougarel’s analysis, the first position would not necessarily win 
out. Karčić’s vision was influenced by the former Yugoslav secular and reformist framework, 
whereas the other visions were motivated by the necessities of the new political context: 
a need for national identity and for national mobilisation. 
Increasingly, Bosnians themselves have presented their Muslim practice as an explicit 
model for Europe. In Zagreb in 2006, Mustafa Cerić – Reis ul-ulema (the elected leader of 
Bosnian Muslims) from 1993 to 2012 – presented his vision in his Declaration of European 
Muslims,225 in which he called for mutual tolerance and respect and a development of 
European Islamic institutions. The declaration was noticed in Europe: Bosnian Islam was 
portrayed in Germany as ‘a model for Muslims in Europe’.226
222 R. Asimovic Akyol, ‘Want to Cultivate a Liberal European Islam? Look to Bosnia’, The Atlantic, 
13 January 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/bosnia-offers-
model-liberal-european-islam/579529/ (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
223 X. Bougarel, ‘Bosnian Islam as ‘European Islam’: Limits and Shifts of a Concept’, in A. Al-Azmeh, 
and E. Fokas (eds.), Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007.
224 F. Karčić, ‘What is the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’, Preporod, 7 December 2006.
225 ‘Islam: Bosnian Cleric Sees Unique Role For Europe's Muslims’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 15 March 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1066720.html
226 Z. Arbutina, ‘Bosnischer Islam als Vorbild für Muslime in Europa?‘, Deutsche Welle, 7 
November 2007, https://www.dw.com/de/bosnischer-islam-als-vorbild-f%C3%BCr-muslime-
in-europa/a-2967679
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Reis Hussein Kavazović, his successor, systematically speaks of Bosniaks, as the 
autochthonous European Muslims. In his lecture at the University of Pecs in 2016,227 he 
gave elaborate exposition as to what makes Bosniaks European and Muslim at the same 
time. Firstly, their Islamic tradition in terms of law, since the Ottomans bestowed ‘the 
most flexible’ of the four schools of Islam on the Balkans. Secondly, the fact that Bosniaks 
did not ‘become Turks’ but retained local customs such as outdoor prayers and never 
took to polygamy. Thirdly, the occupation by Austria-Hungary in 1878 meant the end of 
a ‘traditional form of religious and ethnic self-isolation’ and the necessity of religious 
and intellectual dialogue with another civilisation. It meant ‘confrontation’ with, and 
‘reflection’ upon various styles of thinking, governing and social conduct. It finally resulted 
into a process of ‘securing an autonomy’ within this new modern world by building a self-
governing religious institution. Finally, since Bosniaks ceased to be subjects of universal 
empires and became a part of a periphery, European identity has come to represent a 
‘universal’ anchorage for them. Reis Kavazović refers to Bosnian religious intellectuals who 
highlight the need for the ‘meeting between religion and science’ (H. Neimarlija), and the 
necessity of a secular state (F. Karčić) and of a ‘dialogical consciousness’ (E. Karić).
Another prominent Bosnian Islamic figure, the former director of the Institute of the 
Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks Dr. Dževada Šuško, presents a similar self-understanding 
of Bosnian Islam as European in her German text, ‘A model for Europe? History and Practice 
of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, from 2017. While echoing the historical background 
outlined by Dr. Kavazović, she elaborates on two other aspects: the tradition of Bosnian 
Islamic reformist thought and the nature of the Islamic institutions. Bosnian traditional 
clerics and modernist intellectuals helped namely to absorb ‘the civilizational shock’ of 
losing the status of subjects of a universal religious leader (the caliph) and becoming a 
religious minority under a Catholic emperor. In 1882 the Grand Mufti permitted Muslims 
to serve in the Austrian army, and in 1884 the Tuzla mufti declared that it was permitted 
under lslamic law to live in the Christian state. The social consequences of modernisation, 
such as the presence of women in public places, the schooling of girls etc. became 
controversial. Often, a strong Islamic case was made for modernisation and a leading 
reformist, Džemaludin Čaušević, was elected as reis. The Islamic reformist tradition became 
the basis of the Islamic revival from 1970s.
The Islamic Community (IC) became a ‘substantial part of the religious identity of the 
Bosniaks’ (Šuško 2017). It offers itself as a model: it is self-financed, self-administered 
and ‘half-democratic’. All important positions are filled through elections – direct at the 
level of the džemat (local community) and indirect at higher levels, including the reis. The 
IC in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ruled by a modernised constitution. Dževada Šuško also 
highlights the centralised nature of the IC: all imams are nominated at the local level and 
appointed directly by the reis. Imams and religious teachers are educated in six secondary 
lslamic schools and three university faculties. As a result of the representative and 
centralised nature of the IC, the institution is stable, adaptable and most importantly, she 
notes, was able to withstand the danger of radicalisation. Indeed, due to its complex and 
adaptable structure, the IC was largely able to impose its central authority on all mosques 
and most informal fundamentalist groups, and continues to enjoy concrete legitimacy 
among the faithful it serves and represents.
227 Debate in Hungary with Reis ul-ulema: ‘Bosniaks have no complex because they are 
Muslims and Europeans‘,‘Mađarska besjeda reisu-l-uleme: Bošnjaci nemaju kompleks zato 
što su muslimani i Evropljani‘, lecture at the University of Pécs, 29 April 2016, via http://bit.
ly/2zvzR2D  (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
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Bosnian Islamic institutions in historical context 
When Reis Kavazović says that the main heritage of the Bosniaks is their ‘religious 
foundation and institutionalisation within the IC’, he may be supporting the optimistic 
assessments of those who think that Bosnian Islam may be a direct model for Europe. 
Yet traditions and institutions are organically grown social phenomena. When looking 
at the ‘Bosnian model’ in its historical context, it becomes evident that modernisation, 
institutionalisation, self-governance etc. are results of mostly non-linear, complex and 
agonistic historical processes that could well have had very different outcomes. 
One example is the above-mentioned proposal of former reis Mustafa Cerić. Alongside his 
declaration of 2006, he engaged in many-faceted public diplomacy and spoke on behalf 
on European Muslims in the aftermath of dramatic situations, in a moment when the 
European Muslim diaspora had no recognisable representatives. He made a strong case 
for the mutual recognition of Islam and secularism, for the institutionalisation of Muslim 
communities in Europe and even for a single Muslim authority in Europe.228 The project was 
unrealistic at the time, which Reis Cerić has since acknowledged. While European states 
awkwardly work towards institutionalisation, or rather, a ‘churchification’ of Islam, there is 
no clear end in sight for this process.229 
Institutions, as well as theological consensus and identities, develop in conflicts with 
unknown outcomes. It was not otherwise in Bosnia. Institutional autonomy, reformism 
and the acceptance of secularism were as much products of circumstance as results of 
intentional action. 
Bosnian Muslims accepted their new existence as a minority within a Christian Empire 
with reluctance. Even after accepting the Habsburg legacy and modernisation as a part of 
their identity, Bosniaks continue to speak about the period as an occupation. After 1878, 
Bosnian Muslim lived through what has come to be known expressively as ‘a civilizational 
shock’. The ceding of administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary 
by the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was mitigated by promises of religious 
autonomy and continued attachment to the formal sovereignty of the Ottoman caliph. 
However, in 1882 the Austrian emperor created the office of reis ul-ulema, in order to 
detach Bosnians from the control of the Ottoman Sultan-caliph in Istanbul and elevating 
the pro-Austrian mufti of Sarajevo to the office. 
Later, when Bosnian Muslims mobilised for religious and administrative autonomy (1899–
1909) alongside Balkan nationalist movements, they wanted to return under the jurisdiction 
of the caliph. Their demand for autonomy was primarily defensive – spurred on by the 
Austrian state’s exploitation of Islamic endowments, forceful modernisation and by a fear 
of Catholic proselytising. This mobilisation for autonomy was eventually vindicated after 
the official incorporation annexation of Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908, 
and then after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Atatürk in 1924.
Similarly complex was the destiny of modernist theology in the Bosnian identity. The fatwas 
228 M. Cerić, ‘The challenge of a single Muslim authority in Europe’, European View 6, 2007, pp. 
41–48.
229 N. Vinding, ‘Churchification of Islam in Europe’, in N. Vinding, E. Racius and J. Thielmann (eds), 
Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe, (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
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in favour of continued life under a Christian emperor and serving in his army were responses 
to almost existential crises – a large exodus of up to a fifth of the Muslim population, and 
an uprising against a military draft. The ability of Muslim law to pragmatically interpret 
precedents in Islamic history helped to save Bosniaks as a nation. Even more telling is 
the later fate of modernist thought. In the effervescent interwar period, young Muslim 
intellectuals were bringing in modernist ideas from Cairo and Istanbul and campaigned 
for social reforms. A series of intellectual battles were fought between modernists and 
traditionalists in their respective spheres. While many outspoken modernists could count 
among themselves prominent personalities, such as the first Bosnian-chosen reis Čaušević, 
they by no means were winning the culture war. In fact, Bosnia proved difficult for the 
Austrian rulers to modernise. While benefiting from Austrian sponsorship of higher Islamic 
education, Bosnian Muslim institutions managed to resist and stall many modernising 
policies from traditionalist positions, such as women’s schooling (at a time when universal 
schooling was law in the rest of the Austrian Empire). On the matter of female full veiling, 
the modernising reis also lost the battle and was criticised for being too impressed by the 
reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.230 In Bosnia, the fear of losing their identity through 
changes in social norms was at least as great as the ideals of social development.
The identification of Bosinaks with Islamic reformism in fact comes from a much later 
period – the last decade of Yugoslavia. In the 1940s, the fascist occupation and the 
subsequent communist regime repressed or eliminated many Bosnian intellectuals, 
especially the traditionalists like M. Handžić and M. Busuladžić. Between the 1970s and 
mid-1980s, the communist regime relaxed its control of religious activities and a limited 
Islamic revival ensued. Since then, the IC has focussed its limited resources on salvaging 
Islam as a practice, culture and institution. It has succeeded in renewing educational 
institutions, such as the faculty of theology in 1977 and a women’s madrassa in Sarajevo. 
Secondly, its leaders, especially Husein Džozo, made rational inquiry, reformist thought 
and practical legal questions key parts of the faculty’s curriculum.231 Modernised teaching 
included recognition of the secular framework of Islamic law and practice. Finally, the IC as 
institution has cemented its role as the umbrella organisation of Bosnian Muslims through 
new media outlets, through incorporating Sufi lodges and through claiming a monopoly 
on the wealth tax (zakat) in order to finance Islamic schools to preserve Muslim identity.
Hence, there was no straightforward process towards what makes Islam unique in Bosnia 
today. Many of those remarkable characteristics of Bosnian Islam hailed today as liberal or 
progressive were not based on a modernist consensus, but rather crystallised in complex 
processes and often resulted from necessity. Centralisation, reformism and Islamic 
education instead became defining elements of Bosnian self-understanding relatively 
recently – in a moment when Islam became a question of identity.
230 X. Bougarel, ‘Farewell to the Ottoman Legacy? Islamic Reformism and Revivalism in Inter-War 
Bosnia-Herzegovina‘, in N. Clayer and E. Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, (London: Hurst 
2008), pp. 6.
231 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Cambridge 
Programme for Security in International Society (C-SIS), (Cambridge 2003), pp. 6.
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Defending the tradition 
A second characteristic of the Bosnian model is the fact that Bosnians themselves have 
started reflecting the specificity of the ‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’ recently and in the 
context of a new religious pluralism. This has driven institutions to make active efforts to 
define, strengthen and preserve the Bosniak tradition.
It is notable that what seems to be the basis of the official self-understanding of Bosnian 
Muslims as defined above is that it is not treated as identity but is usually as ‘tradition’, 
specifically, ‘the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’. This tradition, as defined by Karčić 
in 2006, became a quasi-official position of the IC. Links to Karčić’s ‘What is the Islamic 
tradition of the Bosniaks’, which was first published in the fortnightly outlet of the IC 
Preporod, can be found on the official IC website, on the websites of regional organisations 
of the IC in Bosnia and Germany and on official think-tanks of the IC.232 The five elements 
are consistently echoed by Bosnian Muslim representatives. The reason is that the Bosnian 
tradition is not only a practical self-definition, but an instrument of self-positioning in a 
religious context that has suddenly become dangerously pluralistic. 
Since the end of communism, Islam has faced three sorts of challenges in the region: 
the politicisation of religion in nationalist politics of the 1990s; increased involvement by 
foreign actors from the Muslim world during the war and after independence; and finally, 
the pluralisation of the Islamic scene in Bosnia itself. All have thrown into question the 
autonomy and authority of the IC in Bosnia. The IC has gradually learned to answer those 
challenges. With substantial foreign help, it has rebuilt its infrastructure, opened secondary 
schools and faculties, educated its religion teachers and imams, founded various organs 
and publications, and managed a change in the direction of the IC. 233 In the early 2000s, 
the IC liberated itself form the overwhelming influence of a political party and diversified 
its financial support from various parts of the world – seeking alliances not only in the 
Gulf, but also in Turkey and more recently in the EU.234 But the most demanding challenge 
proved to be the inner pluralism in Bosnia itself.
Since the late 1990s, the penetration of various Islamic trends into Bosnia via the Internet 
led to ‘a change in Islamic discourse in Bosnia’.235 Many hitherto absent ideas and types 
of religious organisation were spreading rapidly: minority sects (Shia, Ahmadiya), Turkish 
neo-Sufis (Hizmet, Suleymancis) and neo-Salafism.236 
The last trend represented the only real challenge. Several neo-Salafi groups openly 
232 Islamska Zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, 30 August 2007, http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1646:cta-je-to-qislamska-tradicija-bocnjaka
q&catid=90&Itemid=222,also available at https://www.cdv.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
Fikret-Karcic-Sta-je-to-islamska-tradicija-Bosnjaka.pdf
233 See forthcoming publication by Z. Hesová and E. Rašidagić, ‘The Changing Role of the 
Traditional Islamic Organization: three challenges to the restored Bosnian Islamic community‘.
234 K. Öktem, ‘New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim 
Balkans’, European Studies Centre, Oxford (2010).
235 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Cambridge 
Programme for Security in International Society (C-SIS), Cambridge (2003), pp. 14.
236 A. Ross Solberg, ‘The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans’, Südosteuropa, 
55(4), 2007.
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questioned the monopoly of the IC. Neo-Salafi groups started offering alternative fatwas 
on their websites, separate Islamic education to adults and Qur’an courses to children. 
Neo-Salafi leaders have also openly disputed the legitimacy of certain traditional religious 
practices such as outdoor prayers, receiving ‘pocket money’ for funeral rituals, keeping 
mausolea, the calculation of Ramadan timings, etc. 
A dissident Islamic discourse was disseminated by Saudi-financed translations of religious 
literature and Islamic centres founded by former mujahideen.237 Later, a generation of 
Bosnian preachers took over and initiated an even fiercer attack on the legitimacy of IC’s 
monopoly and its practices. Because dozens were educated in Saudi Arabia, they could 
base their differing vision of Islamic practice on their mastery of Arabic, on the aura of 
conservative authenticity and on a corpus of literalist neo-Salafi quranic references. The 
years 2005–2007 were marked by debates about confessional belonging within Islam (the 
madhabs) and they finally escalated in attempts by neo-Salafi groups to occupy or take 
over mosques.238 In 2012–2013, dozens left for Syria and threatened the IC from there.  
In a belated response, the IC sought to reaffirm its authority and legitimacy. It pursued 
two main strategies: strict and soft. First in 2006, the IC adopted a ‘Resolution on the 
interpretation of Islam’, calling upon imams to ‘be consistent in the interpretation of the 
institutional learning of Islam on the basis of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and our experience 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, as well as reaffirmed its sole authority over religious objects 
and in rules concerning the usage of religious houses.239 As it became obvious, asserting 
authority is not the same as possessing it, and conflict ensued. It became necessary to 
look for other means of legitimising the IC’s authority, and by defending that which the 
challengers attacked – the Bosnian practice of Islam. 
Although the ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’ was a ‘constitutional category’ of the IC 
since 1997 (pace Dž. Šuško), it remained a vague reference. Attempts to give the Bosnian 
tradition a clear rationale became one of the main strategies for responding to what the IC 
terms ‘exclusive’, ‘radical’ or ‘extra-institutional interpretations of Islam’.240 
Prof. Karčić’s definition proved to a useful basis on which the IC could fully reassert 
its authority. It was able to legitimise the initially empty notion by developing and 
institutionalising the Bosnian tradition. In 2008, the rijaset (the executive office of the IC) 
established the Institute for the Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks (IITB). Under Dr. Šuško, 
it was tasked with carrying out research into the history of the Bosniaks and engaging in 
public debates about their tradition. It started research into many of the criticised aspects 
of the Bosnian popular practice but also into the neo-Salafi criticism itself.241 The institute 
started publishing works of Bosnian Islamic thinkers to build a corpus of national Islamic 
237 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 15-16.
238 A. Kadribegović, ‘Vehabije osvajaju Sarajevo!‘, Preporod, Godina XXXVII, broj 5/847, 1. 3. 2007, p. 
9
239 Islamska zajednica, ‘Odluka o džamijskom kućnom redu’, http://islamskazajednica.ba/
images/stories/URADITI/kucni%20red.pdf (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
240 H. Karčić, E. Subašić, ‘Vaninstitucionalna tumačenja islama u Bosni i Hercegovini: djelovanje 
NVO i medija’, Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća: izazovi novih tumačenja 
islama, Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, (2018), pp. 145–166. 
241 E. Duranović, S. Ljevaković-Subašić, (eds.) ‘Izazovi novih tumačenja islama: islamska tradicija 
Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća’, Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, 2018.
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knowledge production – giving a basis for the claim of a distinct Islamic tradition. 
The IC also began to regularly organise public conferences on the notion of ‘tradition’ 
– considered by some to be ‘the most important academic meeting organised by the IC
in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina’.242 The conferences allow to debate over what makes up 
the Bosnian tradition, to bring arguments for its Islamic soundness and to discuss the 
challenges. Their proceedings reflect various trends: the notion of a tradition, the plurality 
of Islamic discourses, Sunni identity and finally empirical studies neo-Salafi groups and 
their challenge the authority of the IC in theological argumentation and media attraction. 
They also reflect a choice of Turkey as a partner in this endeavour. 
Liberal process of constructing a tradition rather than tradition of a liberal Islam
While the meaning of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks remains somewhat suspended 
between official and critical discourses that do not always meet, the Bosnian IC succeeded 
in establishing the notion of a Bosnian Islamic practice worth defending, capable of uniting 
the community, and open to some degree of discussion. 
In his definition, Karčić made sure to say that he does not attempt to add any adjective to 
Islam: there is no Bosnian Islam to promote against, say, Saudi Islam. He rather sought to 
theologically locate the Bosnian practice and to list the characteristics that Bosnians care 
about.243 Tradition is different from culture: it is based on adherence to certain principles, 
but it is also a product of a common history and other norms and values (secularity, 
coexistence and organisation). Talking about ‘tradition’ allows one to talk about a universal 
system of religious and ethical norms in a specific, local guise. Only from the perspective 
of tradition can reformism, institutionalisation and secularism become part of what a 
people may be asked to adhere to. Tradition finally allows one to define one’s identity 
without creating divisions – Bosnian tradition is a part of a Sunni tradition, and therefore 
of Islamic tradition.
Even if only IC insiders were included in official events (along with several neo-Salafi 
insiders who recognize the IC), many groups, including Islamic activist websites, neo-Salafi 
websites and secular newspapers, participated in a larger societal debate. The last public 
conference of the IC showed signs of mutual recognition between the official institution 
and certain critical trends: a distinction was made between those Islamic groups who 
criticise certain aspects of the IC position from within, that is, who despite reservations do 
recognize the IC, and those ‘extra-institutional interpretations’ that dispute the IC outright 
(Karčić, Subašić 2018).244
Hence, the process of constructing a tradition has proven flexible enough to slowly 
encompass diversity rather than create division. It also allowed for changing positions and 
242 A. Smajić and M. Fazlović, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovinaů’, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 7, 
(Brill: Leiden, 2015), pp. 118, 205. 
243 The other subject of IITB events were history of Balkan minorities, genocide, diaspora and 
secularism.
244 H. Karčić and E. Subašić, ‘Vaninstitucionalna tumačenja islama u Bosni i Hercegovini: 
djelovanje NVO i medija’, Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća: izazovi novih 
tumačenja islama. Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, (2018), pp. 145-166.
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possibly even for creating a convergence on certain topics, on a moderately conservative 
basis. For example, the IC seems to have reflected upon neo-Salafi successes. It has taken 
account of the problematic status of informal payments for funeral rituals,245 and of the 
absence of youth work. It has since initiated a series of programs for imams and, with 
the help of Norway246 (Perry 2016:32) and the EU,247 for youths to promote moderation, 
the Bosnian tradition and its European orientation. On the other hand, it made use of 
the liberal value of freedom of religion to advance collective religious rights and entered 
the debate about secularism and courts with a fatwa that defined the hijab as a religious 
obligation.248
The success of tradition as a process does indeed confirm what Dž. Šuško has underlined: 
the prevention of strife and extremes. The internal challengers have largely accepted the 
necessity of a common framework for defining common values, identity, tradition, but 
also recognised their agency in that very process. Nowadays, conservative or neo-Salafi 
intellectuals are the most active writers on practical subjects of social relations, family 
issues and religious morality, and they do so within the framework of the IC.249
Hence, the open process of tradition-finding does not make the Bosnian practice liberal 
per se. On the contrary. The need to constantly justify its Islamic legitimacy in the context of 
the ‘defence of a tradition’ may have pulled it towards more self-consciously traditionalist, 
communal or socially conservative positions or at least towards an acceptance of such 
positions. In this new context, the rational vision of an individualist religion that Bougarel 
has ascribed to Fikret Karčić may be losing ground after all to more communal, conservative 
projects of Bosniak Islamic identity.
But the process itself makes the tradition ‘liberal’ in another sense. The institution proved 
capable of navigating the plurality of positions, ideologies and influences. The capacity for 
evolution along a pragmatic set of rules while retaining a link to its foundational norms 
could be a sign of what Charles Taylor defines as secularity.250 Bosnian institutions rarely 
invoke religious authority anymore, but rather seek to gain legitimacy through inclusion 
and persuasion. 
Conclusion
245 Reis Kavazović and the Fatwa Council have respectively declared giving extra money for 
funerals unethical and paying for communal meals untraditional. See: ‘Od sada zabranjeno 
davanje “koverte” hodžama‘, http://www.kozarac-mutnik.com/index.php/obavijestenja/510-
ekskluzivno-od-sada-zabranjeno-davanje-koverte-hodzama (Accessed 20 March 2019)  
246 V. Perry, ‘Initiatives to Prevent/Counter Violent Extremism in South East Europe: A Survey of 
Regional Issues, Initiatives and Opportunities’, Regional Cooperation Council, Sarajevo, 2016.
247 Počela realizacija projekta ‘Moje mjesto u Evropi: izgradnja i promocija dijaloga o EU 
integraciji’, Islamskazajednica.ba, http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/vijesti/mina-
vijesti/27642-pocela-realizacija-projekta-moje-mjesto-u-evropi-izgradnja-i-promocija-
dijaloga-o-eu-integraciji (Accessed on 25 March 2018)
248 Al-Jazeera, ‘Vijeće muftija: Hidžab je vjerska obaveza’, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/
vijece-muftija-hidzab-je-vjerska-obaveza (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
249 See a book on Bosnian tradition published by Muharem Štulanović, the Saudi educated 
former dean of the Islamic pedagogical faculty in Bihać: Faith and tradition in the Bosniak 
identity (2017).
250 See C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007).
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In most Bosnian Muslim self-descriptions, the Bosnian practice of Islam is based on a 
centralised institution, the IC, and the experience of pluralism, reformism and secularism. 
Such a self-perception does not reflect an explicit model – that is, a set of ingredients and 
principles for a liberal, European Islam. Rather it is the sign of successful efforts in finding 
responses to the multiple challenges of globalisation, religious pluralism, and challenges 
to confessional authority through the construction of an ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’.
Some ten years ago, the Bosnian Islamic Community initiated a path to reaffirm its authority 
and legitimacy through the notion of a Bosnian tradition. Tradition as a process seems to 
have led to a more pragmatic framing of religious and ideological conflicts. It helped to 
channel conflict into discursive controversy and institutionalising dispute into a process 
for open-ended yet controlled identity formation. While the emerging identity cannot be 
expected to be necessarily liberal or individualistic, it has a procedural character that 
evolves within a modern, secular framework. 
Not every Islamic community has its own ‘tradition’. Diasporic Muslims in Europe are very 
plural if not divided in their respective national traditions, ideological trends; indeed 
other Balkan Islamic communities struggle to even define their national traditions in the 
face strong foreign influences. Bosnian Muslims have the advantage of being attached 
to an organisation that is complex and adaptable enough to evolve and engage to some 
extent in self-reflective processes. Rather than a set of principles, its ‘model’ consists in a 
pragmatic and prudent organising of religious life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.251
251 'Zašto je Evropi zanimljiv 'bosanski islam', Al-Jazeera, 3 June 2017, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/
vijesti/zasto-je-evropi-zanimljiv-bosanski-islam
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